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Smart Meter Devices and The Effect of Feedback on Residential Electricity Consumption: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Northern Ireland  
 
 
 
Abstract:  
Using a unique set of data and exploiting a large-scale natural experiment, we estimate the effect 
of real-time usage information on residential electricity consumption in Northern Ireland. 
Starting in April 2002, the utility replaced prepayment meters with advanced meters that allow 
the consumer to track usage in real-time. We rely on this event, account for the endogeneity of 
price and payment plan with consumption through a plan selection correction term, and find that 
the provision of information is associated with a decline in electricity consumption of 11-17%. 
We find that the reduction is robust to different specifications, selection-bias correction methods 
and subsamples of the original data. The advanced metering program delivers reasonably cost-
effective reductions in carbon dioxide emissions, even under the most conservative usage 
reduction scenarios.  
 
 
JEL Classification: Q40, Q41, D8  
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Smart Meter Devices and The Effect of Feedback on Residential Electricity Consumption: 
Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Northern Ireland 
 
by  
 
Will Gans, Anna Alberini and Alberto Longo 
 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
Residential buildings account for a large share of the world’s energy consumption, and 
offer a natural target for policies that seek to reduce CO2 emissions from (fossil-fuel) power 
generation, dependence on imported fuels, and vulnerability to supply shocks. For these reasons, 
there is tremendous policy interest in programs to reduce energy consumption and increase 
energy efficiency in the residential sector.  
It is difficult for consumers to keep track of current electricity usage and/or predict future 
electricity demand.
1
 Many observers argue that providing better information and feedback on 
consumption helps improve energy conservation and energy efficiency in the residential sector—
by itself or when combined with other traditional policy tools such as economic incentives, 
pricing and regulation. Earlier evaluations of information-based approaches, however,  relied on 
short-lived pilot projects or small groups of households, which resulted in small sets of data 
(Fischer, 2008; Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2010), and have been complicated by self-selection 
issues due to the voluntary nature of certain initiatives, such as utility-provided audits (Hartman, 
1988; Waldman and Ozog, 1996).    
Recent technological advances, such as “smart” and advanced meters and the associated 
infrastructure (advanced metering infrastructure, or AMI), can give consumers feedback on 
                                                          
1
 Other goods that share these features include, for example, cell phone minutes and internet access time (Grubb, 
2009). Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006) and  Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) study preferences for three-part 
tariffs and flat rate even when the consumer would save money by choosing alternate pricing schemes, which they 
attribute to underestimating the variance of future demand, risk and loss aversion, and disutility associated with the 
price per se.  
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consumption by combining frequent automated usage readings with accessible displays. AMI has 
received much recent attention and, at least in the US, generous federal funding. Despite the 
scale of support from the government and the utility industry, there has been little evaluation of 
these programs.  
In this paper, we use an advanced metering implementation in Northern Ireland to 
provide the first large-scale evidence of the effect of usage feedback on residential consumption. 
Specifically, we estimate household response to the provision of immediate feedback about 
electricity consumption.   
Northern Ireland is a unique setting for studying residential energy consumption for three 
reasons. First, the retail residential rates are among the highest in the United Kingdom and 
Europe, but, until recently, consumers lacked an alternative provider for electricity. This suggests 
that they may be willing to make behavioral changes to save on their energy bills when given an 
opportunity to do so.
2
 
Second, there are a host of payment plan options for electricity in the Northern Ireland 
market. These include credit accounts, direct debit accounts, and prepayment accounts. The 
variation in attributes across plans allows us to identify the effect of price and changes in other 
important plan features.  
Third, one of these plans (prepayment) recently experienced an exogenous change in 
technology (the keypad) which provides immediate feedback about usage. Moreover, because 
this plan requires prepayment, it suggests that households on it will be monitoring their usage. 
The switch away from the previous meter that served prepayment customers, which did not have 
these capabilities, occurred in April 2002. We interpret this as the treatment in a natural 
                                                          
2
 These incentives should be particularly strong for so-called “fuel poor” households. Government estimates suggest 
that about one-third of the households in Northern Ireland are “fuel poor,” with fuel poverty being defined when 
10% or more of the household income is spent on all household fuel use (DSDNI, 2006). 
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experiment and use it to identify how electricity consumption was affected among the 
“treatment” customers. Our “controls” are customers in other plans (which do not use AMI 
meters and do not provide real-time information about usage to the consumer). This is a large 
scale natural experiment, since 14% (over 75,000) of the NIE customer base was on a 
prepayment plan at the time of the switch to the keypad metering technology. 
Economic theory does not predict unambiguously the effect of information on electricity 
usage on electricity consumption. Gans et al. (2011) develop a simple theoretical model where 
the fraction of energy wasted is controlled with monitoring and information, which can be either 
substitutes or complements. In this framework, there are countervailing incentives to substitute 
electricity savings for savings on monitoring. Whether or not feedback (i.e., the keypad) about 
usage enables consumers to reduce their electricity demand (through conservation or energy-
efficiency investments) is, therefore, an empirical issue.  
We examine this matter using data from 18 waves of Northern Ireland’s Continuous 
Household Survey (from 1990 to 2009), which we merge with price and plan information from 
the electricity utility, and weather data. Our dataset is a multi-year cross-section and is comprised 
of over 45,000 usable observations. Despite the single-provider electricity market, prices varied 
over time and across payment plans during our study period.  Since electricity price depends on 
the plan, but plan choice may depend on unobserved household characteristics that influence 
both consumption and plan selection, we implement the Dubin-McFadden (1984) correction in 
our demand equations.  We also account for unobserved heterogeneity using geographic fixed 
effects. We find that controlling for housing type, heating, household characteristics and 
selection into the plan, the keypad results in 11-20% less electricity use.  
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The keypad may provide a cost-effective alternative to large scale rebate or efficiency 
incentive programs in meeting emission reduction and demand response goals. In terms of CO2 
emissions, we find that the keypad delivers emissions reductions at a cost per tonne of CO2e of 
£25 or less, where £25 is the price of carbon used by the UK government in its policy analyses 
(DECC, 2009). Other benefits of the keypad or similar usage feedback systems, which we do not 
try to assess in this paper, include reduced metering, billing, outage investigation and fraud-
related costs for the utility, reductions in conventional air pollution associated with power 
generation, and improved energy security.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous 
literature. Section 3 describes the utilities of Northern Ireland, prices and plans for the residential 
sector. Section 4 presents the model and the empirical approach. Section 5 describes the data. 
Section 6 presents the results. We offer concluding remarks in Section 7.  
 
2. Previous Literature  
Imperfect information and uncertainty about the price of electricity have received much 
attention in the energy economics literature.  Shin (1985) discusses consumers’ use of the 
average price of electricity (as opposed to the marginal price) when it is difficult to track due to 
seasonal price changes, block tariffs, and fuel surcharges. Hassett and Metcalf (1993) and 
Metcalf and Rosenthal (1995) study the effects of uncertainty about future energy prices on the 
pattern of energy efficiency investments. Ito (2010) summarizes alternative models of consumer 
behavior in the presence of block pricing, showing that people will invest effort in finding out 
the price of energy only to the point in which the gains from re-optimizing consumption 
decisions exceed the cost of the effort spent monitoring and investigating prices.  
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In contrast, the literature on consumer response to information about energy usage (as 
opposed to price) is relatively scant. Traditionally, utilities have provided information to a 
customer about his or her energy consumption level (and on how to reduce it) by offering free or 
low-cost audits.
3
  Individualized audits, however, are typically utilized by only a small fraction 
of the customer base.  Because they are voluntary, it is likely that people who reduce energy use 
after an audit would have done so anyway. Hartman (1988) finds that audits do decrease energy 
usage, but that failure to account for self-selection grossly overstates the impact of the audit 
program. To illustrate, during 1977-1981 (his study period) the average conservation truly 
attributable to the program is 951 kWh/yr—only 39% of the savings calculated based on a naïve 
comparison between participants and non-participants.  
Waldman and Ozog (1996) use a sample of participants and non-participants in a choice-
based sampling framework, and assume that, absent any type of incentive, there is a “natural” 
level of conservation, which they identify using the consumers who are not aware of the 
existence of utility incentives (and consequently receive zero incentive). They estimate that the 
program truly accounts for only 71% of the total conservation, the remaining 29% being 
“natural” conservation (i.e. that would have happened regardless).  
While audits are typically one-off events, recently attention has been focused on ways to 
provide continuous, or at least frequent, feedback to consumers about their energy usage. Darby 
(2006) surveys earlier studies involving the provision of information, both direct (“immediate, 
from the meter or an associated display monitor”), and indirect (“feedback that has been 
                                                          
3
 These are often included in the utilities’ Demand Side Management (DSM) programs, along with other initiatives 
for encouraging conservation and peak load management. See Loughran and Kulick (2004) and Auffhammer et al. 
(2008) who compute the cost per kWh saved by DSM programs in the US in the 1990s. Dulleck and Kaufmann 
(2004) use monthly time series data for household electricity usage in Ireland from 1976 to 1993 and relate them to 
Demand Side Management policies that provided information and offered minor incentives to customers. Their 
analysis is constrained by the fact that they observe only aggregate data, so they estimate a seasonally-adjusted time-
series model of energy usage. They find that the introduction of information programs reduces long-term electricity 
usage by 7%. 
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processed in some way before reaching the energy user, normally via billing”). Reductions in 
consumption are in the 5-15% and 0-10% range, respectively. These are in line with the 
estimates documented in the review by Ehrhardt-Martinez et. al (2010).
4
  
Gleerup et al. (2010) study SMS cell phone and e-mail messaging to alert consumers 
when usage levels are exceptionally high, and find that these approaches reduced consumption 
by about 3%. In this paper, however, we are concerned with the feedback about electricity usage 
provided by devices placed in the consumer’s home. Matsukawa (2005) estimates the effect of 
feedback information on residential energy usage in Japan. He finds that those residential 
customers who were given access to an informational display explaining how to use appliances 
more efficiently reduced energy usage by 1%, even though the display was not connected with 
any one appliance and no monetary incentives were offered to encourage conservation.  
A more technologically sophisticated approach to provide usage information is to deploy 
advanced metering devices. These include “smart” meters and advanced meters. Smart meters 
are two-way wireless communication devices that i) measure, store and transmit usage data to 
the utility at regular intervals, allowing it to monitor usage and bill the customer for it remotely 
without having to physically read the meter, and ii) can be used to convey real-time tariff 
changes, supply-wide conditions and peak-load information to the consumer (Darby, 2010).
5
 
                                                          
4
 One way to enhance or manipulate the feedback provided by regular utility bills is to augment it with “social 
norms” contents. In a randomized field experiment involving 80,000 households in Minnesota, information about 
the energy usage of neighbors and visual cues about doing “better” or “worse” in electricity usage relative to similar 
neighboring homes has been found to reduce energy consumption by 1.9% relative to the baseline (Allcott, 2008). 
The effect decayed over time, perhaps because of the diminishing scope for learning from a neighbor’s bill over 
time. Effects of similar magnitude (2% and 1.2%, respectively) were observed in similar large-scale randomized 
trial experiments in Sacramento, California, and Portland, Oregon (Ayres et al., 2009). These declines in usage were 
sustained over time, and were generally proportionally larger among households with large pre-treatment 
consumption. In one of the two study locales (Sacramento) electricity consumption actually increased among 
households with low pre-treatment usage. 
5
 Smart meters are also used to implement dynamic pricing plans. Briefly, dynamic pricing refers to any electricity 
tariff that changes over time, but where the levels and/or timing when these prices are in effect are unknown 
(Faruqui and George, 2002). Lijesen (2007) summarizes evidence about real-time pricing (a type of dynamic 
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Advanced meters (usually referred to as Automated Meter Readers, or AMRs) are simpler, one-
way communication devices that perform only function i).  
Either type of meter can be used to provide instantaneous usage level updates to the 
customer, for example by using an in-home display.
6
  Presumably, this usage information assists 
consumers in adjusting consumption through conservation or by investing in energy-efficiency 
equipment. Advanced metering is an important component of the so-called “smart grid” and in 
2009 the US federal government awarded over $4 billion to projects aimed at modernizing the 
grid under President Obama’s “Stimulus Act” (see www.smartgrid.gov).  
In Europe, in 2009 the European Commission’s Directive 2009/72/EC (European 
Commission, 2010) requires Member States to “ensure the implementation of intelligent 
metering systems that help consumers to participate actively in the electricity and gas supply 
markets.” The Directive further requires that “Where an economic assessment of the long-term 
costs and benefits has been made, at least 80 % of those consumers who have been assessed 
positively, have to be equipped with intelligent metering systems for electricity by 2020,” and 
that consumers be informed of “actual electricity consumption and costs frequently enough to 
enable them to regulate their own consumption.” Implicit in this statement is the assumption that 
providing feedback about usage can and does result in adjustments and changes to usage itself, 
which is the research question at the heart of this paper. 
To our knowledge, however, only few projects funded by governments or the utilities 
have allowed consumers to access information about usage in real time. The majority of these 
projects have been small in scope and duration (Fischer, 2008), or have omitted important 
variables, thwarting efforts to evaluate the impacts of information on electricity consumption. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
pricing) and Wolak (2011) provides a recent assessment of peak-load based pricing using data from one such 
program in the Washington, DC, area in 2008-09. 
6
 Darby (2010) notes that in-home display devices are frequently, but incorrectly, referred to as “smart meters.” 
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ACEEE (2010), for example, classifies a study as a “large” study when there are as few as 100 
subjects.  
Fischer (2008) selects 26 projects from various countries over 1987-2006 where feedback 
about electricity consumption was provided to residential customers, and concludes that overall 
feedback does reduce usage by 1-20% percent, with “usual” savings in the 5-12% range. She 
identifies aspects of the feedback provision that were most successful at reducing usage, such as 
breakdown by appliance, computerized and very frequent feedback—which are made possible by 
advanced metering—and sufficiently long project duration. These conclusions should be 
interpreted with caution, however, because only 6 out of the 26 projects involved breakdown by 
appliance, the projects were mostly short-lived, and they involved relatively small groups of 
consumers.  
Faruqui et al. (2010) review 12 projects conducted between 1989 and 2010 in the US and 
Canada, with participation ranging between 60 and 3500 residential customers. The availability 
of usage information reduces consumption by 3-14% (average 7%), with an even more 
pronounced effect (13-15%) when accompanied by pre-payment electricity service plans.   
Ideally, when evaluating the effect of real-time usage information, one would like to 
observe a relatively large group where the information feedback is varied across individuals, and 
compare results with those from a group with no information treatment, before and after the 
introduction of feedback. What we describe in this paper is one such natural experiment. We take 
advantage of the introduction of an advanced metering device to a group of utility customers in 
Northern Ireland in 2002.  This device replaced a preexisting meter that did not display 
information. The meters and meter replacement affected only customers on a prepayment plan; 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
10 
 
those on other plans were not affected, suggesting that the latter serve as a “control group.”7  We 
have a large sample with tens of thousands of households, extensive information on dwelling and 
household characteristics, and we take advantage of the variety of utility plans available in 
Northern Ireland to study on this important question. 
 
3. Background on Utilities and Pricing Schemes in Northern Ireland  
As we explain in detail below, we use data from a large multi-year cross-section survey 
of households in Northern Ireland. Our study period is 1990-2009, and during this time Northern 
Ireland Electricity (NIE) was the electric monopoly for the residential sector in all of Northern 
Ireland.  As of September 2010, NIE had approximately 750,000 residential customers with an 
average annual consumption of 4100 kWh.
8,
 
9
  
We use NIE’s historical tariff information, from 1990 to the present, to construct our 
electricity price data and convert bills to kWh used. NIE has offered a variety of pricing and 
payment schemes throughout our study period (see tables 1 and 2).
10
  NIE’s prices tend to be 
somewhat higher than electricity tariffs in the rest of the UK. For example, in 2009—the last 
year of our study period—at 3300 kWh a year, the average price per kWh (inclusive of Value 
Added Tax [VAT]) in Northern Ireland was ₤0.1558 for “credit” customers (those who pay their 
bill upon receiving it in the mail), ₤0.1499 for direct debit customers and ₤0.1518 for pre-
payment customers. In the same year, the UK averages were ₤0.1346, ₤0.1240 and ₤0.1386, 
                                                          
7
 In a paper examining payment behavior of prepayment customers, Brutscher (2011) uses a propensity score 
matching technique to estimate a consumption reduction for NIE keypad customers. However, his approach is 
limited by (i) the omission of price from his demand equation, and (ii) the short time period and small sample from 
which he draws his data. The utility’s own assessment of the effect of the keypad (Boyd, 2008) is limited to a 
sample of 324 customers and is silent about recruitment into the study, study period, and statistical technique used. 
8
 Communication by Gerry Forde of NIE, 7 December 2010. 
9
 The Northern Ireland residential market was opened to competition in June 2010, and NIE estimates that it loses 
about 3000 customers a month because of this. Competition existed before 2010 in the commercial and industrial 
markets. 
10
 Detail on NI Electric’s latest prices are available at http://www.nieenergy.co.uk/latestprices.php.  
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respectively, and even London’s tariffs were lower than those in Northern Ireland (UK 
Department of Energy and Climate, 2012).  
The default payment frequency is quarterly, but there are discounts available for 
customers who choose to pay by direct deposit, or who choose a pay-as-you go (prepayment) 
plan. As shown in table 1, from 1990 until 1997 NIE charged its customers a fixed fee and a 
constant tariff per kWh. Starting in April 1997, a two-part tariff was instituted, with a fixed fee 
and decreasing block pricing. The prices were 9.16 pence per kWh in the first block (up to 250 
kWh per quarter) and 8.16 pence per kWh thereafter. In April 1999, NIE eliminated both the 
block tariff and the fixed fee, and introduced a constant rate per kWh.  
Nominal prices per kWh increased regularly over our study period, and a steep hike 
occurred in July 2008, when the rate per kWh increased by almost one-third. Prices subsequently 
went down somewhat, but never returned to the pre-July 2008 levels. In addition to this variation 
in the structure of electricity pricing and in the rate per kWh over time, discounts were and are 
given to customers on various plans, as summarized in table 2. For example, starting in April 
1997, EasySaver and Budget customers received a 1.5% discount, not to exceed £10 per year.
11
 
Since April 2002, those customers on NIE’s direct debit monthly and direct debit quarterly plans 
(“managed” plans with even monthly or quarterly payments) have received a 4%  and 2.5% 
discount, respectively, up to a specified maximum annual discount (which was initially £5 and is 
now £40 for the monthly and £25 for the quarterly schemes, respectively).  
Throughout our study period, NIE offered a prepayment program to customers. 
Originally, a coin-operated device was used that had to be “charged” with coin deposits in order 
                                                          
11
 An EasySaver card is a scheme that allows customers to flexibly pay their bill in installments. If, at the time of 
issuing a new bill, there is less than 10% balance on their card (or less than £10), they receive a discount. Under a 
budget account, the customer gets a discount by agreeing to make fixed regular payments. If they miss payments, 
they lose the discount. While the discounts are identical for these plans, the budget is a “managed” plan with regular 
and fixed payment amounts, whereas an EasySaver  plan allows payment amounts and frequencies to vary.  
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to dispense electricity.  In 1993, NIE replaced coin-operated devices for new customers with 
electronic systems, introducing the powercard, which used a plastic debit-type card. Customers 
added money to the card and then inserted it into the meter for electricity to start flowing into the 
home. Owen and Ward (2007) report that the powercard system required visiting the customer’s 
home to change tariffs, was vulnerable to theft and fraud, and required tracking down and 
reconciling usage and billing. Customers frequently experienced card malfunctioning (i.e., loss 
of magnetization) and breakage.  
In 2002, all prepayment customers were switched to a new program called Home Energy 
Direct (commonly dubbed “keypad”). The keypad system eliminated the equipment charge for 
prepayment, and the entire stock of older prepayment devices was replaced with the new 
technology. Concurrent to the switch to the keypad, customers on this plan started receiving a 
2.5% discount (with no maximum limit) and the fixed fee was eliminated.
12
 
The keypad meters combine prepayment with an interactive display that allows 
consumers to easily monitor their electric usage and cost.  The keypad customer purchases credit 
from a store kiosk, over the telephone or on-line, and receives a “vend code,” which he enters 
into the keypad to activate it. Plastic cards are no longer used with the keypad system (Owen and 
Ward, 2007). Using the keypad display, customers can check at any time i) how much credit they 
still have on the card, ii) an estimate of how many more days the credit will be sufficient for, 
based on the previous week’s consumption, iii) usage and cost summaries of the previous day, 
week or month, and iv) real-time electricity usage in kWh, along with the associated cost in 
pounds.   
The keypad does not display an appliance-by-appliance breakdown of usage, although it 
should be possible for a consumer to figure it out by sequentially turning on and off individual 
                                                          
12 Variation in prices was introduced for customers on other plans at the same time. 
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appliances one at a time. A chime warns the customer when the credit is about to be completely 
exhausted, and a small credit (£1) is automatically granted when the credit on the card runs out.   
In sum, the keypad is an advanced meter device (with one-way communication) which 
automatically monitors electricity usage at very frequent intervals (several times per hour), and 
offers the additional functionality of a pay portal and a usage display. As of November 2010, 
households on the keypad accounted for 34% of the NIE residential customer base, direct debit 
monthly plans for 26%, direct debit quarterly for 4.7%, budget accounts for 0.2% and 
EasySavers for 6.3%. Customers on no particular plan (e.g., such as those who receive quarterly 
bills and pay them in cash or by check) accounted for 27.7% of the NIE residential customer 
base.
13,
 
14
 
 
4. Model and Empirical Approach 
A. Theoretical Motivation 
We are interested in modeling the response to information that a typical prepayment 
customer will experience after the introduction of the keypad device. A customer with perfect 
information would always know their electricity consumption, associated bill, and remaining 
balance on the prepayment card. Displaying usage information would therefore have no effect on 
such a consumer. 
What fully informed and rational consumers would do is one thing; what happens to real-
life consumers is another. We argue that inattention is unavoidable: For many consumers, the 
                                                          
13
 Personal communication from Gerry Forde, NIE, 15 December 2010.  
14
 Prepayment is thus much more widespread in Northern Ireland than in the rest of the UK: in the same period, only 
15% of the UK residential customers subscribed to prepayment plans (UK Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, 2012b). Faruqui et al. (2010) report that worldwide over 5 million customers use power on a pre-payment 
basis, with the bulk of pre-payment users in the UK, New Zealand and South Africa. The only two North America 
instances of pre-pay pricing plans reported in Faruqui et al. are offered by Woodstock Hydro in Ontario, Canada and 
the Salt River Project utility in Arizona.  
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gains from monitoring usage are insufficient to justify much monitoring effort (Ito, 2010). As a 
result, little monitoring of usage occurs, and consumers imperfectly observe their electricity 
usage.  We attribute any “surprise” in the amount of usage to inattention on the part of the 
consumer. Observed changes in consumption after an informational device is provided suggest 
that the device did provide “surprise” to inattentive consumers.  
Easier-to-read, real-time information about usage may increase the productivity of 
monitoring, or may serve as a substitute for it. Gans et al. (2011) propose a simple model where 
the consumer derives utility from energy services, and where some electricity is wasted (perhaps 
because the consumer fails to unplug appliances when not in use, or uses them improperly, etc.). 
This model, however, does not provide unambiguous predictions as to whether an exogenous 
change in information increases or decreases monitoring and electricity consumption. The 
competing effects of productivity gains in monitoring from information and an income effect that 
enables more consumption or monitoring make the direction of the effect indeterminate. The 
effect of enhanced information on electricity use is, therefore, an empirical question.  
 
B. The Experiment and the Treatment  
Suppose individuals in a population were assigned at random to a treatment and control 
group for the purpose of determining the effect of the treatment on an outcome variable. Under 
these assumptions, the observed difference in mean outcome is a consistent estimate of the 
average treatment effect on the treated:  
(1)  ,  )1|()0|()1|( 01  iiiiiii cyyEcyEcyE
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where c is a dummy that takes on a value of one when the treatment is in place, and zero 
otherwise,  iy  is individual i’s observed outcome, and y1 and y0 are the potential outcomes with 
and without the treatment (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
 If the assignment to the treatment and control groups is not random, the right-hand side of 
(1) contains an additional term, namely the selection bias, which is equal to  
.  Conventional approaches, such as the difference-in-difference 
estimator or OLS regressions, fail to control for selection bias, but it is possible to get around this 
problem by using propensity score matching, Heckman two-step methods, or other procedures to 
construct a term that soaks up the selection bias (Vella, 1998). 
 As mentioned, in this paper, we exploit the fact that in April 2002, NIE introduced a new 
metering device—the keypad—that allows customers to track consumption in real time, and a 
new pricing structure for its prepayment plan. New prepayment customers were placed directly 
on the keypad plan, and preexisting customers were moved en masse to the keypad, thus 
replacing the existing meters with the more advanced ones and applying the new pricing 
structure. At the same time, the pricing of other plans was changed.  
We interpret the introduction of the new metering device as the treatment of interest, 
customers on prepayment as the treatment group, and electricity consumption as the outcome of 
interest. Our control group is comprised of customers on all other plans. Since the price depends 
on the plan, customers select into their plan, and plan choice may be correlated with energy use 
patterns, there is potential for selection bias. We control for selection bias by using the Dubin-
McFadden selection correction approach, which is well suited to the situation in which people 
select into one of a finite number of possible states.  
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C. The Sample 
We pooled the data from 18 consecutive waves of the Continuous Household Survey of 
Northern Ireland, starting with the 1990-91 wave and ending with the 2008-09 wave. The 
Continuous Household Survey (CHS) is an annual survey conducted by the Northern Ireland 
Research and Statistics Agency (NISRA). It is representative of the (civilian) population of 
Northern Ireland. The CHS elicits information about the dwelling (including type and size of the 
home, tenure, heating, and various living expenses, such as energy), health, education, 
employment and welfare payments.  
The surveys are conducted year-round, with approximately 300 households surveyed in 
each month, and cover different housing types, income levels, and geographic regions. Different 
households are interviewed in each wave of the survey, and so by pooling several waves we 
obtain a multi-year cross-section dataset, rather than a panel.
15
 A breakdown of the data by year 
is presented in table 3.  
Characteristics of the dwelling (including the type of structure, size and age, and 
ownership) come from the “Tenure” section of the questionnaire, whereas information about 
heating and energy use comes from the “Heating” module of the questionnaire. The respondent 
is asked whether the home has central heating, and what fuels are used for heating the home, 
distinguishing between summer and winter heating. He is also asked if each of these fuels is used 
for heating water and for cooking. The questionnaire also elicits the expenses associated with 
each fuel.  Next, the interviewer is instructed to ask the respondent to produce the most recent 
                                                          
15
 It would be interesting to use panel data provided by the utility and containing electricity billing records for 
customers on various supply plans over a sufficiently long period of time, but we do not have such data. One 
limitation of utility-provided billing records is that usually such datasets do not contain information about structural 
characteristics of the dwelling, heating and air conditioning and household characteristics that might explain plan 
selection and usage (Ito, 2010; Borenstein, 2009). Other government-conducted longitudinal surveys, like the British 
Household Panel Survey (used, for example, in Meier and Redhanz, 2010), document energy household energy 
expenditure but stopped collecting information about the household’s pricing plan well before the keypad was 
introduced. 
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electricity bill, and to record the amount billed for the last quarter.
16
 Further questions inquire 
about how the respondent’s household pays for electricity (plan and mode of payment), how 
much he paid most recently, and what period that payment covered.  
 
D. Electricity Demand 
 We begin with the demand equation: 
(2) 

lnEijt 0 j 1 ln pit 2 ln INCijt  x ijt ijt ,  
where E is electricity usage (in kWh), p is the price per kWh, INC is household income, and x is 
a vector of variables thought to influence electricity consumption (weather, characteristics of the 
home and of the household, type of heating and appliances used, dummies for the month or year 
when the household was interviewed). Subscripts i, j and t denote the household, area where the 
household resides, and wave of the CHS surveys, respectively. Clearly,  and  are the price 
and income elasticities, respectively, of electricity demand.  
 As previously explained, the price of electricity varies across plans, and households select 
their electricity plans. Unobservable household characteristics may influence both a household’s 
choice of plan, and hence the price per kWh it faces, as well as this household’s electricity 
consumption. This makes price and consumption endogenous.  To remedy this problem, we 
implement a two-step estimation methodology based on Dubin and McFadden (1984).  
Specifically, we assume that households choose a plan to maximize utility. We posit that 
a household’s indirect utility is a function of characteristics of the households and the home: 
(3)    ikikV  kiθZ , 
                                                          
16
 Any arrears are subtracted, so that the CHS records only the amount billed for the last billing period. 
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where i denotes the household, k denotes the plan, Z is a vector of characteristics of the 
household and/or the home, and  is an i.i.d. extreme value error term with scale 1. The 
household chooses the alternative with the greatest utility, and so the probability of choosing 
plan k is: 
(4)   





 

J
j
jikik
1
)exp()exp()Pr( θZθZ  
with 
1θ  normalized to zero for identification. 
We allow for possible correlation between  and , which makes electricity usage and the 
choice of plan endogenous. To obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients in equation (2), we 
must condition on the choice of plan. Dubin and McFadden assume that  
 (5)  


K
km
mmm ErE ))((
6
)|( 


  
where rm is the correlation coefficient between  and m. Dubin and McFadden show that the 
coefficients in equation (2) can be estimated consistently by running OLS on  
(6) ijtikk
km imt
imtimt
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P
PP
INCpE 










 

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ˆ1
ˆlnˆ
lnlnln 210  γx  
where k is the plan selected by household i, m denotes a plan, the  denote the predicted 
probabilities of selecting the various plans from the first-step multinomial logit of the observed 
plan choices, and the αs are the correlation coefficients from (5) rescaled by the standard 
deviation. 
 Bourguignon et al. (2007) compare the performance of the Dubin-McFadden correction 
term in (6) with a simplified version that imposes the constraint that the α coefficients sum to 
zero, and with the selection correction procedures developed by Lee (1983) and Dahl (2002). 
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They conclude that (6) is the most robust.  We report regression results based on (6), and repeat 
the same regressions with alternate selection correction procedures for good measure.   
 Since our sample is comprised of multi-year cross-sections drawn from the population of 
Northern Ireland, it is impossible to include household-specific effects, and we lack information 
to develop pseudo-panels based on detailed geography and housing type information (Deaton, 
1985; Bernard et al., 2010).  We control for unobserved heterogeneity by including ward-specific 
intercepts (the  in equation (2)), under the assumption that the households and/or the 
dwellings in a ward are similar.
17
  
 
E. The Effect of Usage Information on Usage 
 The question at the heart of this paper is whether providing feedback about consumption 
of electricity makes consumers change their usage levels. In April 2002 NIE replaced the 
powercard plan with the keypad plan, which substituted the old meter with a more advanced 
device that displayed real-time information. What is the (average) effect of such a change?  
To answer this question, we amend equation (6) to include dummies for the type of plan 
the household is on. Formally,  
(7) ijtikk
km imt
imtimt
mijtitititjijt eP
P
PP
INCpE 










 

ˆln
ˆ1
ˆlnˆ
lnlnln 210  δDγx  
where D is a vector of dummies for the electricity scheme the household is on, and vector  
captures the effect that the type of plan has on electricity, above and beyond that of the price 
associated with that plan. We estimate equation (7) in two steps, using the selection correction 
                                                          
17
 Northern Ireland is divided into twenty-six local governmental units called districts. Each district is a collection of 
wards. In Belfast County borough district, for example, there are 52 wards. There are currently 599 wards in 
Northern Ireland. Government officials are elected to represent several wards, and Census statistics are compiled at 
the ward level. For example, the 2001 Census outputs use the 582 electoral wards in existence at Census Day. All of 
these 582 wards had more than 100 residents/40 households. 
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approaches described in section 4.D, since the choice of plan is likely influenced by unobserved 
characteristics of the home or the household that also influence usage of electricity.   
The effect of feedback on log consumption, at least for those households that are on 
prepayment plans, is thus powercardkeypad   . This is equivalent to a prepayment dummy × 
post 2002 dummy interaction term. The proportional effect on kWh consumed is exp(Δ)-1. 
For a “perfectly informed consumer,” the effect would be zero. An effect different from 
zero suggests less-than-perfect information (inattention), which the meter helps correct. Since we 
do not know whether the customer actually checks the meter, this is an “intention to treat” effect 
(see Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 163). 
 
F. The Choice of Independent Variables  
Vector x in equations (2), (6) and (7) is comprised of variables that we expect to 
influence to the demand of electricity directly (e.g., house size, etc.) or via the cost of 
monitoring.  It thus includes the home type (e.g., single-family, semi-detached, etc.), size 
(measured as the number of rooms) and age. It also includes the number of years the household 
has been living in this home to proxy for the household’s familiarity with the energy efficiency 
of this dwelling and the vintage of heating and electrical equipment.  
Dummies for the type of heating system and characteristics of the household (its size, 
number of children, number of elderly persons, number of workers, education, and whether the 
household is comprised of unrelated adults) are also included. Education and other household 
characteristics may also serve as proxies for the cost of monitoring electricity usage.  Finally, an 
important component of x is the weather, which we measure as the heating degree days and 
cooling degree days over the three months prior to the date when the household was interviewed.   
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Vector Z (equation 3) includes all of the above household and dwelling characteristics, 
plus—for identification purposes—others that might influence the choice of plan but should have 
no direct influence on electricity consumption. This set of “excluded variables” is comprised of 
whether the household owns a car, lives in the metro Belfast area, has income in the bottom 25% 
of the sample distribution, and has one or more members with a disability that causes serious 
mobility impairment, since lack of transportation may make plans that require physically going 
out to pay bills less attractive. It is also likely that individuals may choose a plan over another 
based on word of mouth or this plan’s popularity with neighbors and friends. For this reason, we 
include in Z (but not in x) the percentage of the other residents of the same ward in the CHS that 
use: (i) a prepayment plan or (ii) a direct debit plan.   
 
5. The Data   
Attention is restricted to those households that presumably have a reasonable degree of 
control over the use of energy at their premises. For this reason, we excluded from the initial 
sample (N=55,065) i) squatters and households who live at a given location rent-free, ii) 
households for whom the dwelling serves as a business premise, and iii) observations where the 
respondent refused to provide information about tenure. We also excluded iv) persons or 
households that rent a single-room within a house or apartment, as that is likely to capture 
lodgers and other types of temporary housing arrangements where the respondent has little 
control over fuel use and bills. Items (i)-(iv) together account for around 1% of the original 
sample.  
Finally, we excluded observations where the most recent electricity bill is missing, those 
with missing information about the selected plan, and households with an electric storage heater, 
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since these households would typically adopt the Economy7 tariff schedule, which makes it 
impossible for us to calculate the kWh used based on the CHS data.
18
  We further trim the 
bottom and top 1% of the distribution of electricity kWh in the sample. This leaves us with 
N=45,149 usable observations for our regressions. In subsequent regressions, we further exclude 
households that rented their dwelling from the Housing Executive (i.e., public or assisted 
housing, which account for 21.77% of the original sample) or from a housing association (a 
private charity that provides low-cost housing: 2.40% of the original sample), which results in a 
sample of 34,779 observations.  
Table 3, panels (B) and (C), shows the breakdown of the final two samples (with and 
without public housing) by year. Table 4 displays descriptive statistics about the housing units in 
our samples, which are comprised primarily of single-family homes (38% and 44%), followed by 
semi-detached and terraced homes (21 and 33%, respectively).  
In the sample that includes those that live in public housing, approximately 32% of the 
households own the home outright, 38% are paying a mortgage, and the remaining 30% rent 
their homes. The majority of those who rent their homes rent them from the Housing Executive 
(about 22%) or from a housing association (2.39%). Only 6.43% of the sample rent their homes 
from private landlords. When households who rent from the Housing Executive or a housing 
association are excluded from the usable sample, renters account for 6.89% of the sample and all 
of them rent from private landlords. 
Information about heating is reported in table 5. Northern Ireland has a mild climate, with 
the temperature rarely higher than 75º Fahrenheit (24º Celsius), and thus little demand for air 
conditioning. As a consequence, much of the energy usage in the residential sector in Northern 
                                                          
18
 NIE however reports that only about 7% of the households subscribe to this tariff plan, which is effectively a 
time-of-use plan with nighttime prices much lower than daytime prices. 
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Ireland is for heating. Homes are heated with coal, fuel oil, natural gas, electricity, wood or peat, 
as well as other non-traditional fuels. In fact, a majority of homes in our sample use more than 
one fuel in their home. We cannot tell for sure from the CHS which is the most important fuel, 
but because we eliminated from our sample households with electric storage heat and on the 
Economy7 plan, it is reasonable to assume that electricity was only a supplementary source of 
heat in our sample.
19
  
Tables 6 and 7 present statistics on household characteristics and income, respectively. 
To avoid losing the observations from those households that do not report income, we create a 
companion missing income dummy, and recode income to zero when not reported. Income is 
top-coded in the CHS. Households with top-coded income are assigned the highest income class. 
Again, a companion “topcoded” dummy is created. All three income variables must be included 
in our regressions (see section 6).  
Weather data are taken from several monitors in Northern Ireland available from the T3 
Global Surface Summary of the Day from NOAA.  Because the survey asks respondents about 
past energy consumption (typically quarterly), we use a three-month moving average of the 
heating degree days (HDD) relative to 65º F (18 ºC), as is standard practice with the US 
Department of Energy. The mean three-month average for HDD is 490.65.
20
 We also computed 
                                                          
19
 Data from the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change show that the usage of electricity in homes with 
Economy7 plans and electric storage heaters is 50% larger than its counterpart in homes with standard meters. We 
compared electricity usage in our sample across households that do and do not use electricity for heating purposes, 
and found that the difference is only 10%. This brings further evidence in support of our claim that electricity is 
unlikely to be a main heating fuel in our sample.  
20
 We have data from a total from 26 NOAA weather monitoring stations in Northern Ireland. For comparison 
purposes, we also selected the weather records from the Dublin airport, which is on the island, but is part of the 
Republic of Ireland. Out of the 26 Northern Ireland monitoring stations, we used 14 (5 of the remainder had been 
discontinued by the beginning of our study period, 3 were in ambiguous or unidentifiable locations, and 4 did not 
have valid temperature data). These 14 monitoring stations had data for every day of the year, and two were within 
the Belfast metro area. We therefore constructed daily average temperatures, and hence heating degree days for i) all 
of the Northern Ireland monitoring stations, ii) only the Belfast locations, and iii) only the Dublin airport monitor. 
The HDD based on i), ii) and iii) were very similar to one another and in fact the correlation between i) and ii) is 
0.9973, i) and ii) is 0.9897, and ii) and iii) is 0.9939. The regressions reported in section 6 of this paper are based on 
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the cooling degree days, but these ended up being almost always zero, and so we do not include 
them in our regressions. 
Energy demand should, of course, be influenced by the presence of energy efficiency 
investments and appliances in the home. Unfortunately, the CHS does not routinely inquire about 
energy-efficiency investments. The only exception is the 2008-09 CHS (the last wave of surveys 
we use in this paper). Based on specific questions on energy efficiency, we know that by 2008-
09 about 83% of the homes covered by the CHS had attic insulation, 59% had cavity wall 
insulation, 76% had insulated the hot water tank, 56% had insulated the hot water pipes, 83% 
had double-paned windows, 36% had been weather-proofed, 58% had installed low-energy 
lightbulbs, and 15% had a programmable thermostat. 
In the same wave of the CHS, the questionnaire also elicited information as to whether 
the respondent had availed himself of incentives and subsidies for energy efficiency investments. 
Only about 3% had received incentives from the Warm Homes program, and a similar share had 
received other incentives for attic, wall and boiler insulation.
21
 
All homes in the CHS are served by electricity. Descriptive statistics for electricity 
consumption and prices are displayed in table 8. Prices are all deflated to 2009 constant British 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
i), but virtually identical results are obtained when we use the others. We note that—with the only exception of the 
Belfast metro area—we cannot assign to a household the HDD computed from the monitoring station closest to the 
households because we do not know where exactly the household resides.   
21
 The Warm Homes scheme was launched in 2001 by the Department of Social Development to address fuel 
poverty in Northern Ireland. The scheme provides insulation measures, heating measures and energy efficient 
lightbulbs to people on low incomes, targeting 8,250 households every year. Heatsmart, started in April 1999 and 
managed by the Northern Ireland Energy Agency, provides free and independent heating and energy saving advice 
to tenants across Northern Ireland. Winter fuel payments were introduced in 1997 to help low-income seniors with 
the costs of keeping warm during the winter (People aged between 60 and 79 years receive £250 per household, and 
those over age 80 receive £400). A separate cold winter payment of £25 each week, between November 1st and 
March 31st, is available when the temperature is freezing or below for any period of seven consecutive days. This 
extra payment is available to those low-income households receiving Pension Credit, Income Support, Income-based 
Jobseeker's Allowance or Income-related Employment and Support Allowance (ESA). It has been in existence since 
1991. 
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Pounds using the Real Price Index.
22
 We identify tariff plan exactly in the CHS data and assign 
marginal electricity price based on the historical tariff data in table 1. We use the price 
information to calculate the kWh used in the last quarter by each household.
23
 The average 
household uses about 4000-4200 kWh per year, a figure that is similar to the estimates provided 
by NIE.  
In 2008, the average annual electricity consumption in our sample was 3931 kWh. This is 
in line with the average usage per standard (i.e., non-Economy7) residential meter reported by 
UK DECC for Northern Ireland (4188 kWh in 2008 and 3952 kWh in 2009) and for the UK as a 
while (3800 kWh a year) (UK DECC, 2012c). Consumption in Britain is thus much lower than 
that of Sweden and Finland (where the typical household uses 7000-8000 kWh a year), France 
(5500 kWh/year) and the Republic of Ireland (about 5000 kWh/year), and higher than that of 
Germany, the Netherlands (about 3500 kWh a year), and Italy (about 3000 kWh a year).
24
 For 
comparison, the average US household uses 11,480 kWh a year, with an annual total of over 
13,000 kWh at single-family homes (Energy Information Agency, 2011). 
                                                          
22
 The real price index (RPI) is compiled by the UK government: 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Source.asp?vlnk=1442. 
23
 We compute usage as follows. We use the nominal posted prices per kWh from table 1. For the periods with 
constant price per kWh, we subtract the VAT (8% in 1994-1997, and 5% thereafter), from the reported bill. The 
resulting amount must be equal to the fixed fee, plus the price per kWh times the kWh used. We now solve this 
equation for kWh used. When block pricing was present, we use a similar formula, namely bill (before VAT)=fixed 
fee + p1kWh if the respondent’s usage falls in the first block, or bill=fixed fee + p1*250 + p2*(kWh – 250), where 
p1 and p2 are the tariffs per kWh in the first and second block, respectively, and 250 kWh per quarter is cutoff 
between the first and second block.  If the kWh amount that solves the first equation exceeds 250 kWh, then we 
assume that the respondent’s usage falls in the second block and so we obtain usage by solving the second equation. 
To check that these calculations were correct, we computed electricity bills for a household that uses 3300 kWh 
under three alternative pricing plans (credit, direct debit and prepay), and compared them with the corresponding 
figures reported by the UK DECC (2012) in each year between 1990 and 2009. Our calculations match the official 
figures perfectly. 
24
 See http://www.odyssee-indicators.org/reports/household/EE-trends-Household-EU-elec-S4.pdf (last accessed 27 
August 2012) 
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 Information about the choice of payment plans for electricity is displayed in table 9. 
Combined with tables 1-2, this allows us to construct a complete picture of prices, plan features 
and percentage of the sample that selects each plan.  
 
6. Results  
A. Electricity Demand  
Our first order of business to estimate the electricity demand (6), using the two-step 
approach described in section 4. This approach regards price as endogenous with the choice of 
plan, but does not yet include plan dummies. We pool the 18 waves of the CHS and associated 
price and weather information, which means that we impose two sets of restrictions on the 
coefficients: 1) that all coefficients (including price and income elasticities) are constant over the 
sample period, and 2) that the price elasticity is constant across payment plans. These restrictions 
are necessary because of the very limited within-year variation in electricity price in Northern 
Ireland (see table 1). They can be checked by including year dummies and/or re-estimating the 
regression equations over different subset of years (see Halvorsen and Larsen, 2001, and Rapson, 
2011).
25
   
The results for three specifications of equation (6) are displayed in table 10. All of them 
use data from the full study period (1990-2009) and include geographic fixed effects, but omit 
the interview month and year dummies. All t statistics are based on standard errors clustered at 
the ward level.    
Panel (A) reports the simplest specification, where the price elasticity is -0.94 and the 
income elasticity is 0.17. This should be interpreted as the income elasticity conditional on 
                                                          
25
 Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Mansur et al. (2008) allow the slope of the demand function with respect to 
price to vary across fuel choices.  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
27 
 
knowing the income of the household. The coefficients on the missing income and top-coded 
dummies are positive and significant, suggesting that households that do not report their income 
might be wealthy or otherwise have significantly larger electricity consumption than those that 
do.  Top earners consume 14% more than is explained by their imputed income alone. The 
weather does influence electricity usage: The three-month moving average of HDD is positively 
and significantly associated with electricity usage.   
In specification (B), we add variables that describe the type of heat and other 
characteristics of home.  In specification (C), we further add household characteristics. Adding 
regressors results in smaller price and income elasticities than in (A). In both (B) and (C), the 
coefficients on heat type are significant and intuitively appealing: Homes with electric heating 
use more electricity (about 14-17% more), all else the same, and homes heated with gas, oil, 
wood or coal about 7-9% less than the baseline category (all other fuel types).  
Housing characteristics are likewise associated with energy consumption. Each additional 
room increases electricity usage significantly by 4.7-7.9%.  Semi-detached and terraced homes, 
which share one or more walls with a neighbor (and are therefore more insulated from cold 
weather), tend to use, all else the same, 9 -17% less than single-family homes.  All else the same, 
homes built before 1945 and homes built between 1945 and 1965 use roughly the same amount 
of electricity as homes built after 1985 (which is our omitted category). Homes built between 
1965 and 1985 use between 2.6% and 3.9% more. These results are intuitive: Newer homes are 
expected to be more energy efficient; older homes may have been retrofitted or perhaps contain 
fewer appliances.  We also note that during the 1965-85 period there was a small construction 
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boom in Northern Ireland, with homes being built quickly and inexpensively.
26
 Finally, 
consumption depends in a quadratic fashion on the time the occupants have lived in their home. 
Turning to the household variables (panel (C)), the number of children is positively 
correlated with energy usage. Adding an adult increases usage, but at a lower rate if this adult is 
an elderly person. We suspect that the elderly might engage in more energy conservation and use 
fewer appliances than younger individuals.  
Households with greater education levels and more employed persons are associated with 
less electricity usage. The presence of a college-educated adult implies 4.3% less usage. An 
additional worker implies a 2% drop in electricity consumption. These effects may be due to 
greater efforts to conserve energy and improve energy efficiency, or simply capture the amount 
of time spent in the home.  Renters use less electricity than owners, most likely because they 
have smaller homes and fewer electricity-using devices.  
In sum, the results suggest that our data are plausible and consistent with a well-behaved 
electricity demand function. Wald-type tests indicate that i) price and income, ii) the heating 
system variables, iii) dwelling characteristics, and iv) household characteristics are jointly 
significant.
27
 Wald-type tests also indicate that the correction terms are important and should be 
included in the model.
28
 We build on these demand functions to assess the effect of the keypad. 
 
B. What is the Effect of the Feedback? 
                                                          
26
 George Hutchinson, personal communication, 14 December, 2010. 
27
 The Wald-type statistics are, in order, 135.67, 250.96, 158.45, and 250.96 based on run (C). They fall in the 
rejection region of the chi square distribution with the appropriate degrees of freedom (2, 5, 9, and 7, respectively) at 
the conventional levels.  
28
 Based on (C), the Wald-type statistic is 25.72, which falls in the rejection region for the chi square with 8 degrees 
of freedom at the conventional levels. 
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Figure 1 displays average log electricity consumption over time separately for 
prepayment and all other households. Figure 2 presents a similar graph for expenditure on 
electricity bills. The two graphs are consistent with the notion that the keypad may have played a 
role in reducing usage, as has been found in other settings with usage feedback.  
The graph in Figure 1 shows that prepayment and all other customers were similar from 
1994 until CHS wave 2002-03, when the keypad was introduced. T tests confirm that during that 
period the control group’s log usage was undistinguishable from that of the prepayment group. 
Figure 1 also shows that log usage dropped for the prepayment group after CHS wave 2002-03. 
The other customers likewise reduced consumption (perhaps because of rising electricity prices 
or energy efficiency campaigns), but not quite so fast nor to the extent of the prepayment 
households. In fact, if we form sufficiently narrow “windows” around the introduction of the 
keypad event to avoid capturing long-term trends, log usage dropped for the prepayment 
customers, but remained virtually unchanged for the others, as is consistent with the notion that 
these households shouldn’t be affected.29  
To assess the effect of the keypad, we compare log usage for control and prepay 
customers before and after the introduction of the keypad (while controlling for other 
determinants of the demand for electricity) by running regression (7) for windows of various 
width. We construct six such windows.  The first is 2000-2005, since we found that over that 
period powercard and keypad customers, who make up our treatment group, were very similar in 
terms of dwelling type and size, heating and household characteristics (including income, when 
reported, propensity to omit income, and topcoding).  
                                                          
29
 For example, focusing on a relatively small window around the adoption of the keypad (1999-2006) to avoid 
capturing long-term trends, log usage for pre-payment customers indeed declined from 6.87 in 1999-2002 to 6.73 in 
2003-2006 (t statistic 4.86), while that of “account” customers (the most popular plan) remained virtually unchanged 
(6.82 and 6.81, respectively, for a t statistic of 1.06). 
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We then progressively increase the “window” width, focusing on 1999-2006, 1998-2007, 
1997-2009 (the Peace Process was put in place in Northern Ireland in 1997, and this is the 
beginning of a much more economically and socially stable period for this region), 1994-2009 
(since our controls are similar to the prepay households in terms of usage from 1994 to the 
introduction of the keypad), and the full study period (1990-2009). Broader windows contain 
more observations, but generally result in bigger differences in terms of dwelling and household 
characteristics across powercard and keypad holders, and across prepay customers and the 
controls.  
Overall, prepay customers have smaller homes (the difference is about one room), are 
more likely to live terraced homes and less likely to live in a single-family or semi-detached 
home. They also have lower household income and are more likely to be renters than those in 
other plans. Prepay homes are also slightly less likely to use heating oil for heating. Our 
regressions, however, already control for these characteristics, as well as selection into the plan.  
The regression results are reported in table 11.  The regressions include plan dummies, 
and the omitted plan is the traditional “account” plan, the standard offer service for NIE, 
whereby customers are billed quarterly and pay by cash, check or through their EasySaver.  
The results displayed in table 11 are striking. Usage for prepay customers before the 
keypad is usually no less than that of the baseline group, all else the same. By contrast, keypad 
customers’ consumption is usually less than that that of a comparable household in the baseline 
group. The net effect of the keypad is consistently negative and significant—the keypad appears 
to have reduced electricity usage. The magnitude of this effect is progressively stronger as we 
expand the sample period, starting at a 10.67% reduction (standard error 3.64%) in (A) and 
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reaching a 17.68% reduction (standard error 1.32%) in (F).
30
 At its low end, the effect of the 
keypad is thus similar in magnitude to that reported in Owen and Ward (2007) and based on an 
initial group of 200 NIE customers. 
 
C. Robustness Checks  
We also re-run models (D)-(F) with the Lee and Dahl selection correction terms instead 
of the unrestricted Dubin-McFadden approach. For the entire study period, the Lee approach 
estimates the effect of the keypad to be a 16.6% reduction in consumption, whereas the Dahl 
approach produces slightly more modest effects (a 10.4% reduction in usage). In runs not 
reported in this paper, we omitted the geographic fixed effects, finding that price and income 
elasticities, and the effect of the keypad, were within 5% of their counterparts from table 11. 
Fischer (2008) and Darby (2010) warn that there is likely to be heterogeneity in 
household response to in-home usage displays. Households with very low levels of usage (due to 
preferences for conservation or low income) are unlikely to be able to reduce consumption even 
further, and may choose to improve comfort, once they realize that they are on track relative to 
their usual bills.  
To check for this possibility, in table 12 we report the same regressions as in table 11, but 
based on a sample that omits households living in public/assisted housing, who tend to be poorer. 
The coefficients are similar to their counterparts in table 11, and the “average treatment effect” 
of the introduction of the keypad ranges from a 10.45% reduction in electricity usage 
(specification (A)) to a 18% reduction (specification (F)). 
 
 
                                                          
30
 The effct is computed as described in section 4.D. The standard errors are computed using the delta method.  
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Table 13 displays the findings from several other robustness checks. Panel (A) explores 
income or income measurement related issues, showing that the results in table 11 are robust to 
dropping lower income households, higher income households, and households that do not report 
income. Panel (B) of table 13 checks the effect of model specification decisions. Again, the net 
effect of the keypad is robust to excluding price and weather, and excluding income and other 
sociodemographics. We note that in the latter case the omitted income and sociodemographic 
terms are usually picked up by the coefficients on the selection correction terms. When the 
selection correction terms are not included in the model, which means that no allowance is made 
for the endogeneity of price and plan choice, the effect of the keypad is a little less pronounced. 
Finally, including year dummies, has little impact of the effect of the keypad, but results in more 
pronounced—even by 30 or more percent—price elasticities, a result that we attribute to the high 
correlation between them.   
To make sure that we do not incorrectly attribute to the keypad a general decrease in 
electricity consumption in Northern Ireland over time, we conducted a “falsification test” on the 
customers not on the keypad. Specifically, we ran the regressions of equation (7) on non-keypad, 
non-prepay customers (i.e., our control group), with a post-2002 dummy. If the introduction of 
the keypad had no effect other than on keypad customers, the coefficient on this dummy should 
be insignificant. We find that this coefficient is positive, small (the difference in consumption 
varies with the sample period, but is always less than 1%), and statistically insignificant at the 
conventional levels. This reinforces our result that the reduction in usage given house size, 
income, etc. after the introduction of the keypad is specific to a group—the prepayment group—
and does not extend to the rest of the customer base. For comparison, if the same regression is 
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run using a sample that is comprised only of prepayment customers, the coefficient on the post 
2002 dummy is a strongly significant -0.175.  
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our investigation suggests that households do respond to the provision of information by 
using less electricity, even accounting for type of home, heat, household characteristics and 
possible selection of households into pre-payment plans. This effect is quite pronounced. When 
attention is restricted to relatively few years around the introduction of the advanced metering 
device to avoid capturing long-term trends in energy usage, the effect is at 10-13% reduction in 
electricity usage. The effect is stronger (up to about 17-18%) when we use the entire set of data 
available to us (1990-2009). Our findings provide support for earlier claims in the literature for 
smart metering and feedback displays (e.g. Darby 2006; Faruqui et al., 2010), and early findings 
from Northern Ireland (Owen and Ward, 2007), which were all based on small samples and/or  
short-lived pilot programs. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to estimate the effect of 
information using both a large-scale experiment and a large sample.  
Our data do not document how households managed to reduce usage—whether they 
engaged in more careful conservation behavior, unplugged appliances, cut down on usage of 
energy-intensive appliances or undertook energy-efficiency investments (or all of the above). 
Brutscher (2011) suggests that the keypad may act as a commitment device.  
Darby (2010) discusses the benefits of “smart” and advanced metering. From the utilities’ 
perspective, these systems reduce the costs of metering, billing, and investigating outages. NIE 
representatives generally cite lower customer support costs (Livingstone, 2011). The utility loses 
revenue when electricity sales are reduced, but also saves on operating costs by using smart 
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meters, suggesting little or no loss of profit.
31
 That NIE initially planned to install 75,000 keypad 
meters, but now has over 250,000, would seem to be evidence of some derived benefit to the 
utility. Smart and advanced meters also help reduce fraud, and, when combined with demand-
response actions (such as dynamic pricing) assist with peak-load management.  
An additional and important category of benefits are the savings realized by the 
consumer. We calculate that usage reductions like the ones documented in this paper (10-17%) 
imply annual savings ranging from £54.81 to £93.18 (2009 £) for the average prepay customer.  
It is of interest to assess the extent of the carbon emissions reductions attributable to the 
advanced metering device at our study locale, and their cost. The cost of a keypad meter is 
comprised of the purchase and installation costs, plus the cost of operation. Owen and Ward 
(2007) estimate these costs to be an £37-43 (purchase and installation) and £25-30 (present value 
of the operating costs) per meter, respectively.
32
 Assuming no changes in the operating costs in 
the future, total per-unit costs for the life of keypad devices (assumed to be 10 years) are £62-73.  
Each kWh of grid electricity in the UK is estimated to generate 0.544 kgCO2e (DEFRA, 2009).  
Straightforward calculations show that it takes a 12.5% reduction from the average 
prepay usage (4016 kWh per year) over each of 10 years for the cost of a tonne of CO2e to be 
equal to the price per tonne--£ 25 in 2009—generally used by the UK government in its policy 
analyses and calculations; see DECC, 2009).
33
 Larger reductions will be even more cost-
effective.  
                                                          
31
 At least in the US, utilities seeking to install smart meters estimate the reductions in costs due to the smart meters 
to be large. See, for example, http://tinyurl.com/SMECOAMI.  
32
 Owen and Ward (2007) base their estimates on 300,000 installed units, which is slightly more than the 250,000 
installed units in NIE, but indicate that unit costs have been falling over time. On balance we find their estimates 
reasonable.  
33
 The “traded” price of carbon is used for appraising policies that affect emissions in sectors covered by the EU 
ETS (i.e. the power sector). It is based upon estimates of future EUA and global carbon market prices. It is higher 
than the actual prices of Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) that can be bought and sold on the European 
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Perusal of the results reported in tables 11 and 12 suggests that most of our estimated 
reductions are cost-effective, and that our most conservative estimate of the effect of the keypad 
barely misses the £ 25/tonne mark. The cost per ton of CO2e is £28.38 – 33.41 for a 10% 
electricity usage reduction (an effect of magnitude similar to that in specification (A) of tables 11 
and 12), and £20.30 – 23.90 for a reduction of 13.98%, the one in panel (B) of table 11. The cost-
effectiveness of the keypad is thus comparable to that of other, more traditional abatement 
measures.  
These calculations are performed from the point of view of the regulator. There are other 
environmental benefits, such as reductions in the emissions of conventional air pollutants 
associated with power generation, and energy security benefits associated with reduced energy 
usage, which we do not attempt to estimate in this paper, but that are likely to be sizeable and 
deserve future research. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
exchange.  CER contract prices in 2010 fluctuated between €12 and €14, which is approximately £ 11-12 at the 
current exchange rate between the euro and the pound sterling. 
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Figure 1. Log electricity consumption: Average for prepayment (treatment) and control 
households (not adjusted for household characteristics) by year. 
 
 
  
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
6.9
7
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
lo
g 
kW
h
/q
u
ar
te
r 
CHS wave 
controls treatment
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
42 
 
Figure. Log quarterly electricity expenditure (log 2009 £); Average for prepayment (treatment) 
and control households (not adjusted for household characteristics) by year. 
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Table 1. Northern Ireland Electricity Tariffs. 
  
Standing 
charge per 
quarter Unrestricted price (pence per kWh) 
Max. discount 
per year for 
Quarterly 
Direct Debit 
Plan 
Max. discount 
per year for 
Monthly Direct 
Debit Plan  
Apr-90 £11.80 6.84     
Apr-91 £13.09 7.41     
Apr-92 £13.61 7.71     
Apr-93 £14.15 7.87     
Apr-94 £13.95 7.75     
Apr-95 £14.84 8.25     
Apr-96 £15.20 8.45     
Apr-97 £7.94 9.16 first 250 kWh/8.16 thereafter     
Apr-98 £7.94 9.16 first 250 kWh/8.16 thereafter     
Apr-99   9.00     
Apr-00   8.60     
Apr-01   9.38     
Apr-02   9.38 £5.0 £10.0 
Apr-03   9.38 £14.0 £28.0 
Apr-04   9.64 £14.0 £28.0 
Apr-05   9.95 £14.0 £28.0 
Apr-06   11.02 £14.0 £28.0 
Apr-07   10.69 £14.0 £28.0 
Nov-07   11.11 £22.0 £34.0 
Jul-08   12.66 £22.0 £34.0 
Oct-08   16.88 £26.0 £40.0 
Jan-09   15.06 £26.0 £40.0 
Oct-09   14.31 £26.0 £40.0 
Oct-10   14.31 £26.0 £40.0 
     
Notes:     
Prices exclude VAT. Domestic VAT of 8% was introduced in 1994 and was changed to 5% in 1997  
where it has remained until now. 
  
Discounts are 4% for monthly direct debit, and 2.5% for quarterly direct debit, up to the maximum total 
shown in the table.  
   
Keypad metering was introduced in April 2002 with a discount (uncapped) of 2.5% to the standard 
domestic tariffs. 
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Table 2. Discounts offered to specific electricity plans in Northern Ireland. 
Acronym 
used in 
this 
paper name  since discount 
max discount 
per year (£) 
frequency of 
payment 
conditions for extending 
the discount 
  
Easy 
Saver April 1997 1.50% 10 unspecified  
if balance in the account 
is no more than £10 or 
10% of the total bill 
BUDGE Budget 
1970s, 
discounts 
since 1997 1.50% 10 
regular, even 
payments, 
usually weekly-
monthly  
if balance in the account 
is no more than £10 or 
10% of the total bill 
DDM 
Direct 
Debit 
Monthly April 2002 4% 
40 at 
present. Has 
changed over 
the years--
see table 1. 
even monthly 
payments    
DDQ 
Direct 
Debit 
Quarterly April 2002 2.50% 
26 at 
present. Has 
changed over 
the years--
see table 1 
even quarterly 
payments    
Keypad Keypad April 2002 2.50% uncapped  prepay    
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Table 3. Composition of the sample by year. 
  
(A) Full CHS, all 
years 
(B) Sample used in 
this paper 
(electricity 
regressions) 
(C) Excluding 
Housing Executive 
year N percent N Percent N Percent 
1991 3,166 5.75 2,862 6.34 1,976 5.68 
1992 3,107 5.64 2,799 6.2 1,885 5.42 
1993 3,097 5.62 2,557 5.66 1,755 5.05 
1994 3,182 5.78 2,760 6.11 1,927 5.54 
1995 3,220 5.85 2,823 6.25 1,990 5.72 
1996 3,221 5.85 2,752 6.09 2,023 5.82 
1997 2,892 5.25 2,467 5.46 1,808 5.2 
1998 3,024 5.49 2,554 5.66 1,944 5.59 
1999 2,809 5.1 2,364 5.24 1,790 5.15 
2000 3,039 5.52 2,579 5.71 1,972 5.67 
2001 2,800 5.08 2,350 5.2 1,821 5.24 
2002 2,806 5.1 2,342 5.19 1,901 5.47 
2003 2,787 5.06 2,242 4.97 1,836 5.28 
2004 2,769 5.03 2,091 4.63 1,798 5.17 
2005 2,773 5.04 2,059 4.56 1,769 5.09 
2006 2,603 4.73 1,967 4.36 1,713 4.93 
2007 2,726 4.95 1,904 4.22 1,652 4.75 
2008 2,567 4.66 1,914 4.24 1,699 4.89 
2009 2,476 4.5 1,766 3.91 1,520 4.37 
              
Total 55,064 100 45,152 100 34,779 100 
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Table 4. Characteristics of the Home: Descriptive Statistics 
    
(A) Full Sample 
(B) Excluding Housing 
Executive 
Variable Description 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
SFhome Single-family (detached) 
home dummy 
45152 0.387 0.487 34779 0.491 0.500 
SDhome 
Semi-detached home 
dummy 
45152 0.215 0.411 34779 0.243 0.429 
terracehome terraced home dummy 45152 0.330 0.470 34779 0.234 0.424 
totroom total number of rooms  45151 6.793 1.865 34778 7.154 1.900 
h_1945 built before 1945 dummy 45152 0.139 0.346 34779 0.167 0.373 
h_1945_65 built 1945-65 dummy 45152 0.156 0.363 34779 0.153 0.360 
h_1965_85 built 1965-85 dummy 45152 0.315 0.465 34779 0.279 0.449 
 
Table 5. Heating: Descriptive Statistics 
    
(A) Full Sample 
(B) Excluding Housing 
Executive 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
gasheat gas heat dummy  45152 0.096 0.295 34779 0.104 0.306 
oilheat 
heating oil heat 
dummy 
45152 0.504 0.500 34779 0.618 0.486 
woodheat wood heat dummy 45152 0.198 0.398 34779 0.188 0.391 
coalheat coal heat dummy 45152 0.440 0.496 34779 0.390 0.488 
electheat electric heat dummy 45152 0.270 0.444 34779 0.254 0.436 
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Table 6. Household Characteristics: Descriptive Statistics 
    
(A) Full Sample 
(B) Excluding Housing 
Executive 
Variable Description Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
numadult 
Number of adults in 
household 
45152 2.022 0.959 34779 2.130 0.956 
ndepkids 
number of children 18 or 
younger … 
45143 0.770 1.187 34772 0.773 1.169 
renter 
household rents the home 
(dummy)…………….. 
45152 0.053 0.224 34779 0.069 0.253 
nelderly 
number of household 
members 65 and older…. 
45151 0.350 0.622 34778 0.337 0.627 
nworkers 
number of household 
members who work……… 
44956 0.193 0.600 34610 0.216 0.636 
college 
household member has 
attended college 
(dummy)… 
45152 0.110 0.314 34779 0.136 0.343 
students 
unrelated adults, probably 
students… 
45152 0.047 0.213 34779 0.059 0.235 
 
Table 7. Household Income: Descriptive Statistics 
    
(A) Full Sample 
(B) Excluding Housing 
Executive 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
inc_r 
annual household 
income ( 2009 £) 
39061 20448 13482.2 29665 23663.10 13555.63 
recodedlinc_r recoded ln inc_r 45152 8.375 3.378 34779 8.420 3.553 
incomemissing missing dummy 45152 0.135 0.342 34779 0.147 0.354 
topcoded topcoded dummy 45152 0.108 0.310 34779 0.139 0.346 
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Table 8. Electricity Demand and Price 
    
(A) Full Sample 
(B) Excluding Housing 
Executive 
Variable Description 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
kwh 
electricity usage 
(kwh per quarter) 
45152 996.45 544.61 34779 1045.59 549.12 
electprice_r 
marginal price (£ 
per kWh, 2009 £) 
45152 0.115 0.01 34779 0.115 0.008 
lkwh ln kWh 45152 6.754 0.57 34779 6.814 0.547 
lmargprice_r ln electprice 45152 -2.166 0.06 34779 -2.166 0.067 
 
 
Table 9. Choice of Electricity Plan: Frequencies. 
      
(A) Full Sample 
(B) Excluding 
Housing Executive 
decision 
Acronym and 
Description 
Tariff 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
1 
Account (incl. 
EasySaver & Cash) 
Mostly unrestricted 
tariff  33,518 74.23 26,645 76.61 
2 DDM See tables 1 and 2  4,012 8.89 3,803 10.93 
3 DDQ See tables 1 and 2 304 0.67 269 0.77 
4 Budget Account See tables 1 and 2 1,986 4.4 1,567 4.51 
5 DHSS Unrestricted tariff 492 1.09 195 0.56 
6 Powercard Unrestricted tariff 3,158 10.12* 1,229 5.39* 
7 Keypad See tables 1 and 2 1,682 12.06* 1,071 8.93* 
Total     45,152 100 34,779 100 
* =for those years when such option existed. 
 
 
  
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
49 
 
Table 10. Electricity Demand: Effect of Price, Income, House and Household Characteristics. 
Dep. Var.: ln kWh per quarter. T statistics in parentheses. CHANGE FOR D-F 
  
(A) 
weather 
price 
(B) + 
Dheater 
(C) + hhold 
char 
Constant 
1.8990 1.9542 2.8509 
(9.4550) (9.7133) (15.805) 
ln price (2009 GBP) 
-0.9356 -0.6945 -0.7450 
(-18.219) (-13.032) (-14.812) 
recodedlinc_r 
0.1702 0.1352 0.03784 
(25.059) (24.997) (7.6829) 
incomemissing 
1.7666 1.4210 0.4426 
(27.633) (28.078) (9.4714) 
topcoded 
0.1062 0.02938 0.04728 
(14.039) (3.8493) (6.8774) 
lHDD 
0.01967 0.03666 0.02898 
(4.1049) (7.2735) (5.9628) 
gasheat 
  -0.09333 -0.07016 
  (-10.361) (-8.4479) 
oilheat 
  -0.06973 -0.05130 
  (-8.3231) (-6.2901) 
woodheat 
  -0.06838 -0.07499 
  (-9.2859) (-12.476) 
coalheat 
  -0.07946 -0.09425 
  (-9.5942) (-11.505) 
electheat 
  0.1340 0.1616 
  (29.603) (34.649) 
        
Ward Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Heating Type No Yes Yes 
Dwelling Chars No Yes Yes 
Household Chars No No Yes 
R-squared 0.1442 0.2119 0.2983 
N.of cases 45149 45121 44917 
Dwelling characteristics omitted from the table include home type, house age, number of rooms. Household characteristics 
omitted from the table include number of adults, dependent children, elderly, and workers in the household, how long the 
household has lived in this home (duration), duration squared, a college education dummy, renter dummies, and a student 
house dummy. Full regression results are available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 11. Electricity Demand: Effect of Price, Income, House and Household Characteristics. 
Dep. Var.: ln kWh per quarter. 
  
(A) 2000-
2005 
(B) 1999-
2006 
(C) 1998-
2007 
(D) 1997-
2009 
(E) 1994-
2009 
(F) 1990-
2009 
Constant 
3.8171 4.1357 4.1404 3.3099 2.6375 2.8114 
(9.7041) (11.828) (12.402) (13.395) (12.756) (15.444) 
ln price (2009 GBP) 
-0.4956 -0.5146 -0.4498 -0.6542 -0.7836 -0.7187 
(-4.2010) (-5.8312) (-4.5574) (-11.563) (-14.315) (-13.883) 
recodedlinc_r 
0.03248 0.03827 0.03404 0.04226 0.03513 0.04477 
(2.7982) (4.1269) (4.1811) (5.6129) (5.6300) (9.0386) 
incomemissing 
0.4079 0.4431 0.3873 0.4742 0.4195 0.5063 
(3.6230) (5.0670) (5.1708) (6.7818) (7.0068) (10.824) 
topcoded 
0.07235 0.05159 0.05395 0.05844 0.04780 0.04523 
(4.9989) (3.6395) (4.4309) (5.7802) (7.1341) (6.6474) 
lHDD 
0.05288 0.04761 0.05241 0.05540 0.04627 0.02946 
(6.5165) (6.6427) (8.1941) (9.4691) (9.3800) (6.2601) 
gasheat 
-0.06491 -0.07160 -0.07331 -0.07935 -0.05620 -0.06204 
(-4.2939) (-6.0195) (-6.8326) (-7.6942) (-6.5488) (-7.6933) 
oilheat 
-0.09915 -0.09075 -0.08286 -0.06150 -0.03908 -0.03982 
(-7.6720) (-8.2518) (-8.4579) (-6.7918) (-4.3197) (-4.8941) 
woodheat 
-0.04762 -0.04744 -0.05985 -0.05480 -0.07079 -0.07492 
(-3.1963) (-4.3112) (-5.3786) (-4.8861) (-9.2184) (-12.486) 
coalheat 
-0.08011 -0.07658 -0.06609 -0.06589 -0.07509 -0.09815 
(-6.7115) (-7.2879) (-7.3314) (-7.0342) (-9.0025) (-12.076) 
electheat 
0.1115 0.1131 0.1166 0.1257 0.1556 0.1631 
(15.314) (19.310) (20.557) (24.075) (31.137) (34.176) 
DDM 
-0.02442 -0.05862 -0.06723 -0.07057 -0.05533 -0.04918 
(-1.2876) (-3.7530) (-4.7269) (-5.0203) (-4.1583) (-3.8616) 
DDQ 
-0.03819 -0.1185 -0.09230 -0.06657 -0.07436 -0.04914 
(-0.4381) (-1.3770) (-1.2175) (-1.0634) (-1.1868) (-1.1685) 
budge 
0.03186 0.003279 0.01358 0.02259 0.03068 0.05381 
(0.8550) (0.1075) (0.4517) (0.7702) (1.1508) (2.3195) 
powercard 
0.05310 0.03064 0.02113 0.02840 0.04145 0.06538 
(2.3043) (1.5839) (1.1069) (1.2894) (2.0751) (3.2433) 
keypad 
-0.05979 -0.1200 -0.1098 -0.1401 -0.1373 -0.1292 
(-1.7734) (-4.7720) (-5.3951) (-7.2490) (-6.8399) (-6.1989) 
DHSS 
-0.08706 -0.1530 -0.1101 -0.08155 -0.01576 0.05920 
(-1.5314) (-2.6741) (-1.9454) (-1.8335) (-0.3962) (1.4512) 
Effect of the keypad -0.1067 -0.1398 -0.1226 -0.155 -0.1787 -0.1768 
Standard error around effect on usage  0.0364 2.82$ 0.028 0.024 0.0131 0.0132 
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Ward Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Heating Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dwelling Chars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household Chars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.3089 0.2984 0.2909 0.2887 0.2990 0.3014 
N.of cases 13591 17918 22301 28444 36732 44917 
 
Dwelling characteristics omitted from the table include home type, house age, number of rooms. Household 
characteristics omitted from the table include number of adults, dependent children, elderly, and workers in the 
household, how long the household has lived in this home (duration), duration squared, a college education 
dummy, renter dummies, and a student house dummy. Full regression results are available upon request from the 
authors. 
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Table 11. Electricity Demand excluding Housing Executive and Housing Association renters.  
Dep. Var.: ln kWh per quarter 
 
  
(A) 2000-
2005  
(B) 1999-
2006  
(C) 1998-
2007 
(D) 1997-
2009 
(E) 1994-
2009 
(F) 1900-
2009 
Constant 
3.9839 4.5083 4.3661 3.5642 2.5869 2.8371 
(7.447) (8.858) (9.637) (12.819) (10.437) (12.398) 
ln price (2009 GBP) 
-0.4908 -0.4956 -0.4517 -0.6540 -0.7268 -0.6744 
(-2.943) (-3.885) (-3.636) (-10.483) (-12.385) (-11.769) 
recodedlinc_r 
0.0122 0.0123 0.0130 0.0217 0.0267 0.0348 
(1.101) (1.216) (1.494) (2.768) (3.612) (4.956) 
incomemissing 
0.2149 0.1912 0.1887 0.2671 0.3437 0.4210 
(2.001) (2.045) (2.369) (3.773) (4.948) (6.305) 
topcoded 
0.0827 0.0667 0.0659 0.0689 0.0520 0.0503 
(5.376) (4.458) (5.151) (6.142) (6.565) (6.486) 
lHDD 
0.0496 0.0451 0.0504 0.0538 0.0507 0.0376 
(6.145) (6.393) (8.207) (9.775) (10.596) (7.993) 
gasheat 
-0.0457 -0.0478 -0.0573 -0.0539 -0.0349 -0.0441 
(-3.007) (-3.551) (-4.747) (-4.546) (-3.401) (-4.688) 
oilheat 
-0.0650 -0.0580 -0.0588 -0.0403 -0.0091 -0.0130 
(-4.427) (-4.737) (-6.541) (-5.045) (-1.227) (-2.025) 
woodheat 
-0.0265 -0.0289 -0.0442 -0.0345 -0.0432 -0.0492 
(-1.966) (-2.629) (-3.995) (-3.429) (-6.529) (-7.896) 
coalheat 
-0.0447 -0.0405 -0.0283 -0.0326 -0.0326 -0.0487 
(-4.267) (-4.053) (-3.273) (-3.748) (-4.539) (-7.358) 
electheat 
0.0808 0.0803 0.0841 0.0921 0.1139 0.1222 
(9.344) (11.483) (11.580) (14.581) (17.697) (21.576) 
DDM 
-0.0258 -0.0639 -0.0865 -0.1018 -0.1051 -0.1051 
(-1.055) (-3.174) (-4.938) (-5.888) (-5.936) (-6.387) 
DDQ 
-0.0027 -0.0732 -0.0921 -0.1256 -0.1769 -0.1647 
(-0.025) (-0.773) (-1.101) (-1.737) (-2.442) (-3.274) 
budge 
0.0179 -0.0155 -0.0274 -0.0458 -0.0588 -0.0484 
(0.386) (-0.414) (-0.775) (-1.260) (-1.744) (-1.670) 
powercard 
0.0525 0.0229 -0.0101 -0.0260 -0.0513 -0.0348 
(1.528) (0.760) (-0.367) (-0.795) (-1.558) (-1.140) 
keypad 
-0.0578 -0.1094 -0.1520 -0.2163 -0.2382 -0.2381 
(-1.344) (-3.037) (-4.254) (-7.953) (-8.285) (-8.359) 
DHSS 
-0.2098 -0.2741 -0.2855 -0.2886 -0.3137 -0.2950 
(-2.239) (-3.615) (-4.472) (-5.602) (-6.866) (-6.528) 
Effect of the keypad -10.45% -12.39% -13.23% -17.33% -17.04% -18.40% 
Std err around the effect 3.06% 2.68% 3.08% 2.35% 2.25% 2.23% 
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Ward Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Heating Type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dwelling Chars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household Chars Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.3198 0.3065 0.2991 0.2973 0.2985 0.2974 
N.of cases 11030 14531 18056 23082 28994 34584 
Dwelling characteristics omitted from the table include home type, house age, number of rooms. Household 
characteristics omitted from the table include number of adults, dependent children, elderly, and workers in the 
household, how long the household has lived in this home (duration), duration squared, a college education 
dummy, renter dummies, and a student house dummy. Full regression results are available upon request from the 
authors. 
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Table 13. Robustness checks. All regressions are based on the specifications of table 11, unless 
otherwise indicated.  
 A. 
Drop bottom 10% of income 
distribution in the sample drop if income is missing drop if income is topcoded 
sample period 
2000-
2005 
1999-
2996 
all 
years 
2000-
2005 
1999-
2996 
all 
years 
2000-
2005 
1999-
2996 
all 
years 
Δ -0.1250 -0.1512 -0.1959 -0.1042 -0.1417 -0.1872 -0.1151 -0.1537 -0.1930 
s.e.(Δ) 0.0271 0.0239 0.0178 0.028 0.0244 0.0178 0.0267 0.0215 0.0168 
effect on 
consumption -11.75% -14.04% 
-
17.79% -9.90% -13.21% 
-
17.07% -10.87% -14.25% 
-
17.55% 
s.e.(effect on 
consumption) 2.04% 2.06% 1.45% 2.52% 2.11% 1.28% 2.38% 1.84% 1.38% 
N 12823 16871 41188 11470 15306 38905 12313 16294 40055 
          
 B. exclude price and weather 
exclude sociodemographics 
and income 
omit selection correction 
terms 
sample period 
2000-
2005 
1999-
2996 
all 
years 
2000-
2005 
1999-
2996 
all 
years 
2000-
2005 
1999-
2996 
all 
years 
Δ -0.0947 -0.1363 -0.1966 -0.1341 -0.1694 -0.2189 -0.0952 -0.1314 -0.1687 
s.e.(Δ) 0.0265 0.021 0.0165 0.0244 0.0193 0.0178 0.0254 0.0214 0.0171 
effect on 
consumption -9.04% -12.74% 
-
17.85% -12.55% -15.58% 
-
19.66% 9.09% -12.31% 
-
15.53% 
s.e.(effect on 
consumption) 2.41% 1.84% 1.35% 2.13% 1.64% 1.43% 2.31% 1.88% 1.44% 
N 13591 17918 44917 13661 17990 45121 15391 17918 44917 
           C. include year dummies 
      
sample period 
2000-
2005 
1999-
2996 
all 
years 
      Δ -0.1048 -0.1550 -0.1808 
      s.e.(Δ) 0.0278 0.0188 0.0161 
      effect on 
consumption -9.95% -14.35% 
-
16.54% 
      s.e.(effect on 
consumption) 2.50% 1.61% 1.35% 
      N 13591 17918 44917 
       
